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PRACTITIONERS' NOTES
THE STRONGEST DEFENSE YOU'VE NEVER
HEARD OF: THE CONSTITUTION'S FEDERAL
ENCLAVE DOCTRINE AND ITS EFFECT ON
LITIGANTS, STATES, AND CONGRESS
Emily S. Miller*
1.

INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Constitution's Enclave Clause offers a little-known, but
extraordinarily powerful, defense for the multitude of entities operating
within "federal enclaves." These enclaves include, inter alia, military
bases, national parks, post offices, and federal courthouses t The
Enclave Clause has spawned the "federal enclave doctrine," which
renders certain state and common law claims inapplicable within areas
of land ceded by a state to the federal government. 2 Recent cases reveal
the doctrine's potential as a sleeping giant for the defense bar, with one
court going so far as to permanently enjoin the New York State Division
of Human Rights from enforcing the state's Human Rights Law against
an entity working within a military reservation.3
The Enclave Clause, found at Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the
United States Constitution, grants the United States exclusive legislative

. Emily S. Miller is an associate attorney in the Labor & Employment Group at Cozen O'Connor
in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. See Charles F. Wilkinson, Cross-JurisdictionalConflicts: An Analysis of Legitimate State
Interests on Federaland Indian Lands, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 145, 152 (1982).
2. See Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 268 (1963) (holding that state laws are
inapplicable in a federal enclave unless the state "reserved the right to do so when it gave its consent
to the purchase by the United States"). See, e.g., Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1138,
1147-51 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that the federal enclave doctrine barred a wrongful election
claim).
3. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing Brookhaven Science Assocs. v. Donaldson, No. 04-4013,
2007 WL 2319141 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2007)).
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jurisdiction over any parcel of land ceded by a state to the federal
government "for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dockYards, and other needful Buildings. ' 4 The United States Supreme Court
has interpreted this clause to mean that state laws passed after the date
upon which the parcel was ceded by the State to the federal government
- thereby creating a "federal enclave" - do not apply within the
enclave, unless the state specifically retained jurisdiction over the
subject matter at issue.5 Further, common law causes of action that
gained recognition after the date of cession have no application within
the enclave. 6 Moreover, state laws in existence at the time of cession
that are inconsistent with federal purposes do not apply within the
federal enclave. 7 State laws can, however, be saved from an Enclave
Clause bar if Congress specifically authorizes their enforcement within
federal enclaves. 8 Finally, state laws in existence at the time of cession
that do not conflict with federal purposes become federal laws within the
enclave. 9 These basic rules form the foundation of the "federal enclave
doctrine."'
Although the federal enclave doctrine is a powerful weapon in the
defense arsenal for entities operating within enclaves, few litigants seem
to be aware of its existence, and it has gone almost entirely unnoticed by
scholars. 1 This Article seeks to bring attention to the federal enclave
doctrine by analyzing its contours and offering lessons for litigants,
States, and Congress. Part II of the Article explains the history and
development of the federal enclave doctrine. Part III.A offers a roadmap
for litigants who are involved in a dispute that implicates the federal
enclave doctrine. Part III.B offers lessons for States and Congress to
help clarify the delineation of federal and state jurisdiction within federal
enclaves. Part IV concludes the Article.

4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
5. See infra Part II.B (providing an overview of the development of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Enclave Clause).

6. See id.
7.
8.

See id.
See id.

9. See id.
10. See id.
11. The body of law addressing the federal enclave doctrine is relatively small, and research
reveals no published law review articles examining the doctrine.
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II.BACKGROUND
A. 1885: The Enclave Clause Becomes a Doctrine
Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution,
known as the Enclave Clause, is most well known for establishing the
District of Columbia. It gives Congress the power:
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such
District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of
particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority
over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the
State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection 0K Forts,Magazines,
Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.

The italicized provision is the foundation upon which the federal enclave
doctrine is built.
The Supreme Court first addressed the Enclave Clause's effect on
the enforceability of state law within a military base in the case of Fort
Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe. 13 Specifically, the FortLeavenworth case
considered whether a state had the power to assess a tax against a
railroad company operating on the Fort Leavenworth Military
Reservation in Kansas. 14 The parcel of land at issue had been under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States before Kansas was admitted
into the Union in 1861.15 At that point, because the United States did
not exclude the land from Kansas's dominion, the Court noted that the
federal government retained full control only over the portions of the
property being used for military purposes. 16 "So far as the land
constituting the reservation was not used for military purposes, the
possession of the United States was only that of an individual
17
proprietor."
This weakness in the federal government's jurisdiction came to the
attention of the Secretary of War in 1872.18 The Secretary then asked
the Attorney General what could be done to ensure that the federal

12.

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, c. 17 (emphasis added).

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

114 U.S. 525 (1885).
See id.
at 526.
See id. at 526-27.
See id.
at 527.
Id.
Id.
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government regained exclusive jurisdiction over Fort Leavenworth, and
the Attorney General advised that "to restore the federal jurisdiction over
the land included in the reservation, it would be necessary to obtain from
the state of Kansas a cession of jurisdiction."' 9 The Court noted that no
records existed of the government requesting such a cession from
Kansas, but in 1875, the State Legislature passed an Act by which the
Fort Leavenworth Military Reservation was ceded to the federal
government.20 However, the Act reserved to Kansas the right "to tax
railroad, bridge, and other corporations, their franchises and property"
within Fort Leavenworth. 2 ' The plaintiff-railroad argued that the State's
reservation of the right to levy taxes was invalid (and that therefore the
railroad should be permitted to recover taxes already paid), because in
ceding the land the State vested in the federal government exclusive
jurisdiction over Fort Leavenworth, as provided for in the Enclave
Clause.2 2
The Court rejected this argument, holding that the Constitution
gives the United States exclusive jurisdiction only over lands actually
purchased by the federal government with the consent of the State. 3
Because the federal government had not paid for Fort Leavenworth, but
rather had acquired it essentially as a gift from France, Kansas had the
authority to reserve for itself any jurisdiction that did not conflict with
federal purposes. 24thFurther, the Court noted that if any areas within the
ceded territory were not used for federal purposes, then "the legislative
power of the state over the places acquired will be as full and complete
as over any other places within her limits. '25 The Court held that
19.

Id.

20.

See id. at 528.

21. Id. The state also reserved the right to serve criminal and civil process within the enclave.
See id. This reservation of authority was not challenged, and the Court noted that such a reservation
of jurisdiction by a state "is not considered as interfering in any respect with the supremacy of the
United States over [the ceded territory], but is admitted to prevent them from becoming an asylum
for fugitives from justice." Id. at 533.
22. See id. at 528.
23. See id. at 537-38.
24. Id. at 539.
25. Id. The Court softened its view on this point only seven years later. See Benson v. United
States, 146 U.S. 325, 331 (1892). Benson centered on a murder committed within the boundaries of
Fort Leavenworth. See id. at 329. The appellant contended that the federal court before which his
case was tried was without jurisdiction to hear the matter because the crime occurred on a portion of
the property that was being used for farming, rather than for any military purpose. See id. at 331.
The Benson Court rejected this argument, reasoning that all of Fort Leavenworth had been reserved
for military purposes, and "it is not open to the courts, on a question ofjurisdiction, to inquire what
may be the actual uses to which any portion of the reserve is temporarily put." Id. The Benson
Court made no attempt to reconcile this holding with its reasoning on the same point in Fort
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because no argument had been made that the State's reservation of
authority to tax the railroad interfered with any federal purpose, the
reservation was enforceable.2 6
Thus, the Fort Leavenworth Court established the early rules
underlying the federal enclave doctrine: If the federal government
purchases an area from a State with that State's consent, then federal
jurisdiction is complete and impenetrable. 7 However, if a State gives a
parcel of land to the federal government free of charge, then the State is
free to reserve for itself jurisdiction over matters that do not conflict with
the federal purposes to which the land is being used. 28 As discussed
below, these early rules would be modified and expanded upon in the
years to come.
B. The Development of the FederalEnclave Doctrine
The Supreme Court's next significant federal enclave doctrine case
came in 1929, when it decided Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant.29 A fire tore
through a hotel owned by the Arlington Hotel Company on April 5,
1923, destroying some of the hotel guests' personal property. 30 The
property upon which the hotel was situated had been ceded by the State
of Arkansas to the federal government in 1904 for use as a national park,
with Arkansas reserving only the authority to serve civil and criminal
process and impose taxes upon structures erected on the land. 31 The
hotel had operated under a lease from the United States for more than
fifty years at the time of the fire.32
When the hotel guests sued to recover the value of their lost
property, Arlington Hotel Company argued that it could not be held
liable for the losses, pursuant to a law passed by the Arkansas
Legislature in 1913 "relieving innkeepers from liability to their guests
for loss by fire, unless it was due to negligence. 33 The plaintiffs
contended that the federal enclave doctrine rendered the statute upon
which the company relied inapplicable to the hotel at issue, because it
Leavenworth. See id.
26. See FortLeavenworth, 114 U.S. at 541.
27. See id. at 538. The Court would later back away from this position. See James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 141 (1937). See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
28. See Fort Leavenworth, 114 U.S. at 539.
29. 278 U.S. 439 (1929).
30. Id.at 445,449.
31. Id. at 445,448.
32. Id.at 449.
33. Id. at 445-46.
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was passed post-cession.34 In an effort to avoid the federal enclave
doctrine bar, the Arlington Hotel Company replied that the government
did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the property in question, because
it was used as a national park rather than for any of the purposes
enumerated in the Enclave Clause.35
The Court declined to speak on whether the Enclave Clause
generally gives the United States exclusive jurisdiction over land ceded
for use as a national park, because it found that the particular park in
question contained hot springs with waters "of a special excellence with
respect to diseases likely to be treated in a military hospital. 36 Indeed,
the federal government constructed a military hospital near some of the
hot springs.37 Therefore, the Court found that the United States was
justified in securing to itself the "complete police protection,
preservation, and control" of the forty-four hot springs within the ceded
area. 38 Consequently, the federal government enjoyed exclusive
jurisdiction over the land upon which the hotel sat, and the state law
39
relieving innkeepers of liability for losses caused by fire did not apply.
Thus, Arlington Hotel Co. is a rare example of a case in which the
federal enclave doctrine worked in the plaintiff's favor.
In 1938, the Court answered the question left open in Arlington
Hotel Co. and held that lands ceded to the federal government for use as
national parks fall within the Enclave Clause as a matter of law.4 °
Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co. required the Court to rule on
whether California's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act was enforceable
within Yosemite National Park. 41 The Yosemite Park and Curry
Company operated hotels, camps and stores on portions of the Park that
it leased from the United States pursuant to a contract with the Secretary
42th1
of the Interior. Before the lower court, the company successfully
sought an injunction against the enforcement of the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act within Yosemite National Park, arguing that the Enclave
Clause rendered the Act inapplicable to establishments operating on park
grounds.43 The Board of Equalization of California and the State's
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See id. at 446.
See id. at 449.
Id. at 454-55.
Id. at455.
Id.
See id.
See Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 529-30 (1938).
Seeid. at 518.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 522-26.
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Attorney General appealed this result, arguing that land ceded for
national park purposes does not fall within the Enclave Clause's grant of
exclusive jurisdiction." The Court held that the Enclave Clause is not to
be strictly construed and that national parks fall within its purview.4 5
Therefore, those portions of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act that
were not covered by the State's reservation of jurisdiction at cession
were inapplicable within Yosemite National Park.46
47
In 1930, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Unzeuta,
which determined the effect on federal jurisdiction of the United States
granting a right-of-way to a state railroad within a federal enclave. 48
There, as in Benson,49 the Court was faced with a murder committed on
property that had been ceded to the federal government for purposes of a
military reservation. When Nebraska became a state in 1864, the United
States retained ownership of all un-appropriated public lands within the
former territory, and a portion of those lands was set aside as the Fort
Robinson Military Reservation. 0 In 1885, the federal government
granted a right of way over a portion of Fort Robinson to a railroad
company. 51 Two years later, Nebraska passed an act officially ceding
the Fort Robinson and Fort Niobrara Military Reservations to the United
States, providing that "the jurisdiction hereby ceded shall continue no
longer than the United States shall own and occupy such military
reservations. ' 2
Years later, someone was killed in a freight car on the railroad
company's right of way at Fort Robinson, and Unzeuta was indicted for
murder and brought before a federal court. 53 He argued that Nebraska,
not the federal government, had jurisdiction over the right of way, and
therefore the federal court was without jurisdiction to hear the charges
against him.54 The trial court agreed with Unzeuta, and the United
States appealed directly to the Supreme Court under the Criminal
44. Id. at 526-27.
45. See id. at 528-30.
46. Id. at 530. Because the district court considered only whether the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act as a whole applied within the Park, the Supreme Court remanded the matter for a
determination of which portions of the Act fell within the State's reservation of jurisdiction, and
thus were enforceable against Yosemite Park & Curry Company. Id. at 539.
47. 281 U.S. 138 (1930).
48. Id.at 141.
49. See Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325 (1892).
50. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. at 141.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 140.
54.

See id.at 140-41.
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Appeals Act.55 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the question
of federal jurisdiction is not dependent upon whether a portion of the
enclave is used as a railroad under a right of way granted by the United
States, because such rights of way can be used for many purposes that
are "entirely compatible with [the] exclusive jurisdiction ceded" to the
federal government.5 6 Thus, the Court concluded that the district court
had jurisdiction over Unzeuta's case.57
Next, the Supreme Court examined the reach of the Enclave
Clause's reference to "other needful buildings.,, 58 In James v. Dravo
59 the Court made
Contracting Co.,
clear that "other needful buildings"
encompasses locks, dams, federal courts, custom houses, post offices,
and "whatever [other] structures are found to be necessary in the
performance of the functions of the Federal Government., 60 Further, the
Court emphasized a crucial difference between land ceded by a state to
the federal government, and land acquired by the federal government
through a taking.6 t The Court noted that in the event that the United
States takes land from a state through the federal sovereign's right of
eminent domain, its legislative jurisdiction over the property remains
dependent upon cession by the state.62 In other words, state laws apply
within an area taken by the federal government via eminent domain,
unless the state affirmatively cedes the land to the United States either at
the time of, or after, the taking.
Additionally, the Dravo Contracting Court held that the Enclave
Clause carries with it no implication that a state's cession of an enclave
must be made without reservation - regardless of whether the land is
purchased from the state or is otherwise acquired.6 3 Indeed, a state is
free to "qualify its cession by reservations not inconsistent with the
governmental uses." 64 In so holding, the Court seems to have overruled
the portion of Fort Leavenworth that held that the federal government
enjoys absolutely exclusive jurisdiction over lands purchased with the
consent of the state. The Dravo Contracting Court noted that it could

55.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
acquired
64.

Id. at 141.

Id. at 144.
Id. at 146.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.17.
302 U.S. 134 (1937).
Id.at 142-43 (citing Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36, 37 (1908)).
Dravo, 302 U.S. at 147.
Id.
See id. at 148-49. This case involved both land purchased from willing owners and land
by condemnation. Id. at 141.
Id. at 147.
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not reconcile the implication that a state cannot reserve some jurisdiction
over land it voluntarily sells to the federal government with the
"freedom of the State and its admitted authority to refuse or qualify
cessions of jurisdiction when purchases have been65 made without consent
or property has been acquired by condemnation.,
Having determined the types of federal property encompassed by
the Enclave Clause, the applicability within federal enclaves of state
laws passed after cession, and the extent of a state's authority to reserve
jurisdiction over certain matters at the time of cession, the Supreme
Court next was called upon to determine the status of state laws already
in existence at the time of cession. In James Stewart & Co. v.
Sadrakula,66 the Court considered whether a pre-cession provision of the
New York Labor Law, which established requirements for iron and steel
floor beams used in construction projects, applied to the construction of
a post office within a federal enclave.67 The Court held that the
provision remained in effect within the enclave, noting that the
"Constitution does not command68that every vestige of the laws of the
former sovereignty must vanish.,
In so holding, the Court rejected the appellant's argument that,
because some provisions of the Labor Law were irrelevant to the federal
territory, the entire statute was rendered inapplicable within the
enclave. 69 The Court made clear, however, that if the enforcement of a
pre-existing state law would conflict with "the carrying out of a national
purpose," then the state law must be held invalid within the enclave. y
Building upon James Stewart & Co., the Fifth Circuit held in Mater v.
Holley7 that state laws in existence at the time of cession are converted
into federal laws within the enclave.72 Therefore, the Mater Court
concluded that federal question jurisdiction exists over matters arising
on a federal enclave that center on a claim based on a pre-cession state
law.73 To date, the Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue.

65. Id. at 148-49. The Court reiterated this idea in a companion case decided the same day as
Dravo. See Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n of Wash., 302 U.S. 186 (1937).
66. 309 U.S. 94 (1940).
67. Id. at 97-98.
68. Id. at 99.
69. See id. at 102-03.
70. Id. at 103-04.
71. 200 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1952).
72. Id.at 123-24.
73. See id. at 125. See infra notes 114-17 and accompanying text for further discussion of the
federal enclave doctrine's relation to federal question jurisdiction.
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In Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Waggonner,74 the Court revisited the
Enclave Clause's requirement that the land at issue be "purchased" by
the federal government.75 The case centered on a 22,000 acre tract of
land in Louisiana, which the State had donated to the federal government
for use as an air force base. 6 The federal government contended that the
Enclave Clause divested the State of authority to tax privately owned
property on the base.77 The State, on the other hand, contended that the
Enclave Clause did not encompass the property because the federal
government had not paid for it; that is, it was not "purchased" as the
Clause requires.78 The Court quickly rejected this argument, noting that
it "cannot agree to such a constricted reading of [the constitutional
provision] .

Because the federal government undoubtedly could acquire
exclusive jurisdiction over the property had the State consented to its
condemnation, the Court explained, it stands to reason that the same
jurisdiction is acquired when a state donates property to the federal
government of its own free will. 80 Thus, the Court held that pursuant to
the Enclave Clause, "the United States acquired exclusive jurisdiction
when the land was ceded to it with consent of the State (except for the
State's express reservation as to civil and criminal process) just as if the
United States had acquired its title by negotiation and payment of a
money consideration." 81 The Court also rejected the State's argument
that the property was not encompassed by the Enclave Clause because
the federal government had not affirmatively accepted it from the
State.82 In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that "a grant of
jurisdiction by a State to the Federal Government need not be accepted
and . . . a refusal to accept may be proved by evidence., 83 Because the
State had offered no such proof of refusal, the area was properly
considered a federal enclave.84
74.

376 U.S. 369 (1964).

75. Id.

76. Id. at 370-71.
77. Id. at 370.
78. Id. at 371.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 372.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 373.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 373-74. This portion
ceded after 1940, when Congress passed
accept exclusive jurisdiction over land
conclusively presumed that jurisdiction

of Humble Pipe Line does not apply to federal enclaves
a statute specifying how the federal government should
ceded by a state. That statute provides that "[i]t is
has not been accepted until the Government accepts
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Finally, the Supreme Court decided two cases that established that a
state law or regulation, enacted post-cession, will apply within an
enclave if Congress has authorized the enforcement of that state law or
regulation within federal enclaves.85 In Hancock, the Court examined
the possible intersection of the Federal Clean Air Act with the State of
Kentucky's permit requirements for facilities emitting air pollution.86 At
the center of the controversy were several federally owned facilities that
argued they were not required to secure permits that the State mandated
all pollution-producing facilities obtain in order to remain in operation.87
While the State apparently conceded that the facilities at issue were
federal enclaves, it argued that section 118 of the Clean Air Act
constituted congressional authorization for the State's regulations to
apply to those facilities. 88 Although the federal government agreed that
section 118 requires all "federal installations to conform to state air
pollutions standards," it contended that Congress did not go so far as to
authorize Kentucky to compel federal installations to provide the
information required for the permits at issue. 89 After carefully parsing
section 118, the Court held that the statute does not provide clear and
unambiguous authorization for federal installations to be subjected to
state permit requirements. 90 Indeed, the Court concluded,
to the extent it considered the matter in enacting § 118 Congress has
fashioned a compromise which, while requiring federal installations to
abate their pollution to the same extent as any other air contaminant
source and under standards which the States have prescribed,
stopped
91
short of subjecting federal installations to state control.
Therefore,

no Congressional

authorization

existed which would

jurisdiction over land as provided in this section." 40 U.S.C. § 3112 (2006).
85. See Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976); Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S.
174 (1988).
86. 426 U.S. at 168.
87. Id. at 174-75, 180.
88. Id. at 180. Section 118 provides, in relevant part:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any property or facility,
or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge of air
pollutants ....
shall.., comply with L]Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements
...respecting the control and abatement of air pollution in the same manner, and to the
same extent as any nongovernmental entity.
42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (2006).

89. See Hancock, 426U.S. at 181.
90. Id. at 184.
91. Id. at 198-99.
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eliminate the federal enclave bar in Hancock v. Train.
By contrast, in Goodyear Atomic Corp., the Court held that a
federal statute did provide clear and unambiguous authorization for state
workers' compensation laws to apply within federal enclaves.92
Goodyear Atomic Corp. was a private company that operated a federally
owned nuclear production facility. 93 Notably, the property at issue in
Goodyear Atomic Corp. was not a federal enclave, but rather was a
federally owned nuclear plant, being operated by a private company
under contract with the Department of Energy. 94 The case is instructive
nonetheless, because the federal statute in question specifically
addresses federal enclaves. 95
The Court first noted that, under Hancock, a federal facility may be
shielded from state regulation even if it is operated by a private
company. 96 It then held that 40 U.S.C. § 290 provides the clear
congressional authorization required for the plaintiffs state law-based
workers' compensation claim to move forward, because the statute
notes:
States shall have the power and authority to apply [their worker's
compensation] laws to all lands and premises owned or held by the
United States of America by deed or act of cession, by purchase or
otherwise . . . in the same way and to the same extent as if said
premises were under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the State within
97
whose exterior boundaries such place may be.
Thus, Goodyear Atomic Corp. is an example of the type of case in which
the federal enclave doctrine would not bar a claim based on a state law
passed after the territory at issue was ceded to the federal government; it
is also the most recent Supreme Court case examining the federal
enclave doctrine. Having traced the development and contours of the
federal enclave doctrine, we now can move on to an examination of its
more recent application by trial courts.

92.

486 U.S. 174, 186 (1988).
Id. at 176.
94. Id. at 176, 183 n.4.
95. Id. at 183 n.4. (noting that 40 U.S.C. § 290 also applies to federal facilities that are not
federal enclaves).
96. See id. at 181.
97. Id. at 182 (citing 40 U.S.C. § 290 (2006)) (emphasis added).
93.
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C. Modern Application of the FederalEnclave Doctrine
1. Trial Courts Explore the Doctrine's Scope
Although the body of law exploring the federal enclave doctrine is
relatively small, the doctrine's reach has proven to be significant. In
recent years, defendants have successfully used the federal enclave
doctrine to deflect a variety of state law claims, including those based on
state anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation laws, state wage and hour
laws, 99 state workers' safety laws and regulations, 1°° and state consumer
98. See, e.g., Klausner v. Lucas Film Entm't Co., No. 09-03502 CW, 2010 WL 1038228, at
*1-3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (dismissing discrimination claims brought under state law against an
employer operating within the Presidio in San Francisco, despite the fact that the area in which
plaintiff worked no longer was used for military purposes); Hooda v. Brookhaven Nat'l Lab., 659 F.
Supp. 2d 382, 388, 393 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (dismissing claims brought under the New York Human
Rights Law against a federal contractor operating Brookhaven National Laboratory, which is
located within a federal enclave); McMullen v. S. Cal. Edison, No. 08-957-VAP (PJWx), 2008 WL
4948664, at *2, *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2008) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss
discrimination claims brought under state law against a federal contractor providing services at the
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, but also granting plaintiff leave to amend the complaint to
allege that actions complained of occurred outside the federal enclave); Brookhaven Sci. Assocs. v.
Donaldson, No. 04-4013(LAP), 2007 WL 2319141, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2007) (declaring that
New York Human Rights law does not apply to Brookhaven National Laboratory, which is located
within a federal enclave); Sundaram v. Brookhaven Nat'l Labs., 424 F. Supp. 2d 545, 555, 558,
570-71 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (dismissing claims brought under the New York Human Rights Law
against a federal contractor operating Brookhaven National Laboratory, which is located within a
federal enclave); Schiappa v. Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., 403 F. Supp. 2d 230, 238 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(holding same as Sundaram); Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp., Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2-3, 9
(D.P.R. 1998) (dismissing a claim brought under Puerto Rico anti-discrimination law against a
federal contractor operating an MK-30 shop at Roosevelt Roads Naval Station).
99. See, e.g., Torrens v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp., Inc., 396 F.3d 468, 469, 473 (1st Cir.
2005) (remanding for consideration of whether the federal government accepted jurisdiction over
the Roosevelt Roads naval base, such that state wage and hour claims brought against a federal
contractor providing maintenance and other services to the U.S. Navy at the base should be
dismissed); Alvarez v. Gold Belt, L.L.C., No. 08-4871, 2010 WL 743923, at *1, *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 4,
2010) (dismissing a state wage and hour claim brought against a federal contractor providing
training services to U.S. Army at Fort Dix); Manning v. Gold Belt Falcon, L.L.C., 681 F. Supp. 2d
574, 574-75, 577 (D.N.J. 2010) (holding same as Alvarez); Mersnick v. USProtect Corp., No. C-0603993, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94408, at *2-3, *20, *25, *36 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2006) (dismissing
state wage and hour claims brought against a federal contractor providing security services at
Vandenberg Air Force Base); Koren v. Martin Marietta Servs., Inc., 997 F. Supp. 196, 199, 202,
205-06, 209 (D.P.R. 1998) (dismissing state wage and hour claims brought against a federal
contractor working at Roosevelt Roads naval base); George v. UXB Int'l, Inc., No. C-95-20048-JW,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22292, at *2, *9-10 (N.D. Cal. May 3, 1996) (dismissing state wage and
hour claims brought against a federal contractor providing unexploded ordnance remediation
services within the federal enclave of Fort Ord).
100. See, e.g., Janulewicz v. Bechtel Corp., No. 06-CV-1413-H, 2007 WL 2462110, at *1, *34 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007) (dismissing a claim brought under the California Occupational Safety
and Health Act against a federal contractor doing business at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating
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protection laws,'0 1 as well as claims alleging wrongful discharge 10 2 and
personal injury. 103 Additionally, courts have considered the federal
enclave doctrine in relation to many common law claims, including
breach of contract, 10 4 unjust enrichment, 10 5 intentional infliction of
emotional distress, 106 negligent infliction of emotional distress,010 79
defamation, 10 8 breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
Station, which is located within the federal enclave of Camp Pendleton); Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp.,
497 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1155 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (holding same as Janulewicz); Bussey v. Edison Int'l,
Inc., No. CV 08-0158, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14057, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2009) (holding same
as Janulewicz).
101. See, e.g., Overseas Military Sales Corp. v. Suarez-Melendez, No. 08-1479, 2008 WL
793612, at *3 (D.P.R. Mar. 23, 2009) (holding that the federal enclave doctrine bars enforcement of
state consumer protection laws within Fort Buchanan).
102. See, e.g., Stuckstede v. NJCV L.L.C., No. 4:09CV0663 JCH, 2009 WL 3754153, at *1, *4
(E.D. Mo. Nov. 5, 2009) (dismissing a wrongful discharge claim brought under the Missouri Human
Rights Act against a federal contractor and subcontractor working for the National Geospacial
Intelligence Agency within a federal enclave).
103. See, e.g., Crackau v. Lucent Techs., No. Civ. 03-1376, 2003 WL 21665135, at *6 (D.N.J.
June 25, 2003) (holding that the federal enclave doctrine granted the court federal question
jurisdiction over personal injury claims arising from exposure to defendant's product within a
federal enclave); Hamrick v. A & I Co., No. 2:05-0286, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34671, at *13 (S.D.
W. Va. Apr. 20, 2009) (holding that the federal enclave doctrine granted the court federal question
jurisdiction over personal injury claims arising from exposure to defendant's product on multiple
Air Force bases).
104. See, e.g., Alvarez, 2010 WL 743923, at *1-3 (dismissing a breach of contract claim
brought against a federal contractor providing training services to U.S. Army at Fort Dix because
the claim was merely a barred state wage and hour claim recast under common law); Kalaka Nui,
Inc. v. Actus Lend Lease, L.L.C., No. 08-00308 SOM/LEK, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38262, at *8,
*14-15 (D. Haw. May 5, 2009) (denying a motion to dismiss a breach of contract claim because the
state reserved concurrent jurisdiction over Hickam Air Force Base for all purposes); Rivera de Leon
v. Maxon Eng'g Servs., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 550, 551, 560 (D.P.R. 2003) (holding that the court
had federal question jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim arising within Roosevelt Roads
Naval Station); J & L Mgmt. Corp. v. New Era Builders, Inc., No. 1:09 CV-531, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56895, at *4, *11-12 (N.D. Ohio June 16, 2009) (holding that the federal enclave doctrine
did not grant the court jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim because most of the contract was
performed outside the National Space and Aeronautics Glenn Research Center, which is located
within a federal enclave).
105. See, e.g., Alvarez, 2010 WL 743923, at *3 (dismissing an unjust enrichment claim brought
against a federal contractor providing training services to the U.S. Army at Fort Dix because the
claim was merely a barred state wage and hour claim recast under the common law).
106. See, e.g., Cooper v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 170 F. App'x 496, 497-98 (9th Cir. 2006)
(dismissing an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim brought against a federal contractor
providing services at the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station because the state did not recognize
the cause of action at the time of the cession); Celli v. Shoell, 995 F. Supp. 1337, 1341, 1344 (D.
Utah 1997) (dismissing an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because the state did not
recognize the cause of action at the time of the cession of Hill Air Force Base).
107. See, e.g., Cooper, 170 F. App'x. at 498 (dismissing a negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim brought against a federal contractor providing services at the San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station because the state did not recognize the cause of action at time of the cession).
108. See, e.g., Gavrilovic v. Worldwide Language Res., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 2d 163, 176-77 (D.
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tortious interference," 0 promissory estoppel,' quantum meruit,1 2 and
fraud.113
Courts also have given significant consideration to the issue raised
in the 1952 case of Mater v. Holly "14-whether the Enclave Clause
bestows upon a federal court federal question jurisdiction over a
complaint stating only state law claims." 5 Most courts that have
considered the issue have answered in the affirmative, reasoning that
state laws in existence at the time of cession (which do not conflict with
federal purposes) are transformed into federal laws within the enclave."7 6
A minority of courts, however, have reached the opposite conclusion. "1

Me. 2006) (holding that the federal enclave doctrine did not bar a defamation claim because the
doctrine does not apply to military bases located on foreign soil).
109. See, e.g., Kalaka Nui, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38262, at *8, *15, *20 (denying a
motion to dismiss a good faith and fair dealing claim because the state reserved concurrent
jurisdiction for all purposes over the federal enclave encompassing Hickam Air Force Base).
110. Id. (denying a motion to dismiss the tortious interference claim because the state reserved
concurrent jurisdiction for all purposes over the federal enclave encompassing Hickam Air Force
Base).
111. Id. (denying a motion to dismiss the promissory estoppel claim because the state reserved
concurrent jurisdiction for all purposes over the federal enclave encompassing Hickam Air Force
Base).
112. Id. (denying a motion to dismiss the quantum meruit claim because the state reserved
concurrent jurisdiction for all purposes over the federal enclave encompassing Hickam Air Force
Base).
113. Id. (denying a motion to dismiss the fraud claim because the state reserved concurrent
jurisdiction for all purposes over the federal enclave encompassing Hickam Air Force Base).
114. See supranotes 71-73 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1156 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (holding
that the Enclave Clause "grants federal courts jurisdiction over tort claims that arise on federal
enclaves"); Hamrick v. A & I Co., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34671, at *12 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 20,
2009) (quoting Akin v. Ashland Chem. Co., 156 F.3d 1030, 1034 (10th Cir. 1998)) (noting that
federal courts have jurisdiction over personal injury claims arising on federal enclaves); Crackau v.
Lucent Techs., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24317, at *6 (D.N.J. June 25, 2003) (noting that federal
enclave jurisdiction exists over state law claims that arise on a federal enclave); Rivera de Leon v.
Maxon Eng'g Servs., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 550, 588 (D.P.R. 2003) (noting that federal enclave
jurisdiction is a form of federal question jurisdiction).
116. See Steifel, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1156; Hamrick, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34671, at *12;
Crackau,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24317, at *6; Rivera de Leon, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
117. See J & L Mgmt. Corp. v. New Era Builders, Inc., No. 1:09 CV-531, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 56895, at *11-12 (N.D. Ohio June 17, 2009) (holding that the fact that state law claims arise
within a federal enclave is not sufficient to confer federal question jurisdiction upon a federal court);
Diaz v. Gen. Sec. Servs. Corp, 93 F. Supp. 2d 129, 135 (D.P.R. 2000) (holding same as J & L
Mgmt. Corp.). See also Kalaka Nui, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38262, at *2 (ordering the
plaintiff to show cause why the complaint should not be dismissed for failure to sufficiently plead
diversity jurisdiction).
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2. Plaintiffs Attempt to Escape the Federal Enclave Bar
In an attempt to avoid having their state or common law claims
dismissed under the federal enclave doctrine, some plaintiffs have
argued that the actions giving rise to the claims actually occurred outside
the enclave, or that a federal statute authorizes their state law claim
within the enclave." 8 For example, in Stuckstede, the defendant filed a
motion to dismiss the plaintiffs discriminatory discharge claim brought pursuant to the Missouri Human Rights Act - because the
complaint alleged that the discharge at issue occurred within a federal
enclave." 9 In response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff alleged
that the termination actually occurred beyond the enclave at the
plaintiffs home because his termination letter was received at that
location. 20 The court declined to consider the termination letter because
it was not attached to the plaintiffs complaint, and thus found that the
plaintiffs termination occurred at the National Geospatial Intelligence
Agency, which the court found to be a federal enclave. 121 Therefore, the
lawsuit, which was based entirely on state law, came to an
plaintiffs
2
2

end. 1

Similarly, in Bussey v. Edison International Inc., the plaintiff
unsuccessfully attempted to avoid summary judgment in the defendant's
favor by arguing that his wrongful termination claims did not arise
within a federal enclave, but rather originated beyond the enclave at the
defendant's corporate headquarters. 23 Fatal to this argument was the
plaintiffs previous concession that the alleged misconduct leading to his
termination, and his supervisor's investigation thereof, occurred within
the enclave. 24 The court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, concluding that "[e]ven assuming corporate headquarters
performed functions such as payroll processing, record maintenance and
policymaking, all of the actions giving rise to Plaintiffs termination

118. E.g., Stuckstede v. NJCV L.L.C., 2009 WL 3754153, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 5, 2009);
Bussey v. Edison Int'l, Inc., No. CV 08-0158, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14057, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
23, 2009).
119. Stuckstede, 2009 WL 3754153, at *1. The Stuckstede court already had granted the
defendant's previous motion to dismiss the plaintiff's age discrimination claim for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies under the Missouri Human Rights Act.
120. Id. at *2.
121. Id. at *2-3.
122. See id. at *4.
123. Bussey, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14057, at *7-8.
124. Id. at *6-7.
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were taken by employees who worked [within the federal enclave].' 2 5
Other plaintiffs, relying on the rationale underlying Goodyear
Atomic Corp., attempt to avoid the federal enclave bar by arguing that a
federal statute permits them to bring their state law claims within the
enclave. 126 Diaz v. General Security Services Corp. provides an
example of a plaintiff successfully making such an argument before a
trial court. There, the plaintiff alleged that his employer, a federal
contractor that provided security services to the United States Marshals
Service, violated Puerto Rico's wage and hour laws. 2 7 The defendant
moved to dismiss the case pursuant to the federal enclave doctrine
because the events underlying the lawsuit all occurred at a federal
courthouse, which was located within a federal enclave. 28 The plaintiff
countered that the Service Contract Act ("SCA"), which governs federal
contractors' dealings with the government, provides express
congressional authorization of the application of local wage and hour
laws within federal enclaves. 2 9 In an unusual opinion, the court held
that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims,
and remanded the action to Puerto Rico's superior court, but proceeded
to offer guidance
to that court as to how the federal enclave issue should
130
be decided.

The Diaz court agreed with the plaintiff, finding that "[the SCA]
clearly implies that local laws conferring benefits on workers will be
applicable to employees of private companies working at federal
installations.''
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon
language in the SCA requiring that all service contracts worth more than
a statutorily set sum include "a provision for fringe benefits 'not
otherwise required by Federal, State, or local law to be provided by the
contractor or subcontractor.','1 2 The court interpreted this language as
"manifestly assum[ing] the application of local laws benefiting workers"
and held that it provides the clear and unambiguous authorization of
enforcement of state laws within federal enclaves required under
125. Id. at*8-9.
126.

E.g., Manning v. Gold Belt Falcon, L.L.C., 681 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577 (D.N.J. 2010);

Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1158-59 (S.D. Cal. 2007); Janulewicz v. Bechtel
Corp., No. 06 CV-1413, 2007 WL 2462110, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007); Diaz v. Gen. Sec.
Servs. Corp, 93 F. Supp. 2d 129, 136 (D.P.R. 2000).
127. Diaz, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 130.
128. Id. at 131 (citing Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963)).
129. Diaz, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 136.
130. Seeid. at 131.
131. Id. at 135.
132. Id. (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2) (2006)).
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Goodyear Atomic Corp.133 While admitting that the SCA does not
specifically state that local wage and hour laws shall apply within
federal enclaves, the court concluded that "[t]he only reasonable
inference to be drawn from the SCA is that local and state laws were to
provide the foundation upon which the SCA was to be built" and that
"[t]he application of local law providing separate and independent
employment benefits ... was unambiguously assumed.' ' 134 Thus, had
the federal court not remanded the case to the Superior Court of Puerto
Rico, it appears that the plaintiff would have successfully overcome the
federal enclave bar. However, as noted above, the Diaz court's analysis
is mere dicta, and there is no record of subsequent proceedings in the
Superior Court.
Another court, considering a similar argument that the SCA
authorizes application of state wage and hour laws within federal
enclaves, disagreed with the Diaz court and dismissed a New Jersey
Wage and Hour Law claim under the federal enclave doctrine. 35 The
actions underlying Manning v. Gold Belt Falcon,L.L. C. occurred within
the Fort Dix military base, which is a federal enclave. 136 Rather than
rely upon the SCA language at the heart of the Diaz decision, the
plaintiff in Manning contended that the SCA clearly and unambiguously
authorizes application of state wage and hour laws within federal
enclaves through its requirement that employees working under covered
contracts be paid minimum wages 137
"inaccordance with prevailing rates
for such employees in the locality.,
The Manning court compared this language to the statutory
language found to provide the necessary authorization in Goodyear
Atomic Corp., which specifically granted to states "the power and
authority to apply [state] laws to all lands and premises owned or held
by the United States of America by deed or act of cession. '
Held
against this explicit language, the Manning court concluded that the
SCA's reference to prevailing local wage rates did not provide the
requisite clear and unambiguous authorization for application of state
laws within federal enclaves. 139 Therefore, the Manning court granted

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See Diaz, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 135, 141.
Id. at 141-42.
Manning v. Gold Belt Falcon, L.L.C., 681 F. Supp. 2d 574, 577 (D.N.J. 2010).
Id.at575-76.
Id.at576-77 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 351).
Manning,681 F.Supp.2d at577.
Id.
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the defendant's motion to dismiss the state wage and hour claim. 140
Little more than a month after the Manning opinion was issued, another
court relied upon its reasoning to reach the same decision in a related
case.14 1 Similarly, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of California twice has held that a federal statute creating a
process through which states can enact laws governing occupational
health and safety standards with the approval of the Secretary of the
United States Department of Labor does not provide clear and
unambiguous authorization
of the application of state worker safety laws
142
enclaves.
federal
within
The most encompassing example of a plaintiff succeeding with an
argument that application of state laws within a federal enclave is
congressionally authorized is Kalaka Nui, Inc. v. Actus Lend Lease,
L.L. C. 143 There, the plaintiffs common law claims for breach of
contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, promissory
estoppel, and fraud survived the defendant's motion to dismiss under the
federal enclave doctrine, because federal law granted Hawaii concurrent
jurisdiction over military bases within the state for all purposes not
44 The Federal Admission Act, 145
inconsistent with federal purposes.
which transformed Hawaii from a territory to a state, provides that
Congress has exclusive legislative authority over military bases in
Hawaii, but also provides that federal jurisdiction:
[S]hall not .. .prevent [Hawaii] from exercising over or upon such
lands, concurrently with the United States, any jurisdiction whatsoever
which it would have in the absence of such reservation of authority [by
the federal government] and which is consistent with the laws hereafter
146
enacted by the Congress pursuant to such reservation of authority.

140. Id.
141. See Alvarez v. Gold Belt, L.L.C., No. 08-4871, 2010 WL 743923, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 4,
2010).
142. See, e.g., Stiefel v. Bechtel Corp., 497 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1158 (S.D. Cal. 2007);
Janulewicz v. Bechtel Corp., No. 06-CV-1413, 2007 WL 2462110, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27,
2007).
143. No. 08-00308 SOM/LEK, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38262, at *13-14 (D. Haw. May 5,
2009).
144. Seeid.at*l-2.
145. Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4 (1959).
146. Kalaka Nui, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38262, at *13-14 (quoting Pub. L. No. 86-3, 73
Stat. 4, 11-12).
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The defendant offered no authority suggesting that the plaintiffs
common law claims, brought against a contractor working on Hickam
Air Force Base, were inconsistent with federal purposes.1 47 Therefore,
the court rejected the federal enclave148defense, and concluded that the
plaintiffs claims could move forward.
3. The Federal Enclave Doctrine Can Be Used to Quash Litigation
Even Before a Complaint is Filed
As the preceding overview demonstrates, although plaintiffs have
enjoyed some success in overcoming the barrier set by the federal
enclave doctrine, it remains an extremely powerful defense. Indeed, it
also can pack a powerful offensive punch for entities that regularly work
within federal enclaves and are weary of being sued for alleged
violations of state law, as Brookhaven Science Associates v.
Donaldson1 49 illustrates. After being sued several times for violations of
the New York State Human Rights Law ("HRL"), Brookhaven Science
Associates ("BSA") brought an action against the New York State
Division of Human Rights ("SDHR") seeking a declaratory judgment
that the HRL is inapplicable to any claims arising from conduct
occurring at Brookhaven National Laboratory ("BNL"). 150 BNL is
located on Camp Upton Military Reservation, which is a federal enclave,
and operates under contract with the Department of Energy. 151 Further,
BSA sought a permanent injunction "prohibiting the SDHR from
processing, investigating or otherwise proceeding with any pending or
future cases against BSA for any alleged conduct occurring at
[BNL]. ' ' 152
The court began its analysis by articulating three theories regarding
the applicability of state laws within a federal enclave. 15 3 "Under the
147. See Kalaka Nui, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38262, at * 17-18.
148. Id.
149. See Brookhaven Sci. Assocs. v. Donaldson, No. 04-4013(LAP), 2007 WL 2319141, at *1,
*9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2007).

150. Id. at *1.
151. Id.
152. Id. Specifically, BSA sought a declaration that: (1) "pursuant to the federal enclave
doctrine and Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the United States Constitution, the SDHR is without
jurisdiction to enforce the HRL with respect to BSA;" and (2) "any claim against BSA under the
HRL is preempted by the United States Constitution." Id. at *4. Additionally, BSA sought an order
preliminarily and permanently enjoining the SDHR from proceeding with two of the cases pending
against it, as well as "an order preliminarily and permanently enjoining the SDHR from proceeding
in any and all pending and future cases where BSA is named as a respondent." Id.
153. See id. at *5 (citing Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.P.R.
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first theory, when an area becomes a federal enclave, the state law in
effect at the time of cession becomes federal law and is the applicable
law unless Congress provides otherwise."' 5 4 The second theory provides
that "state regulatory changes consistent with state laws which were in
place at the time of cession are applicable within a federal enclave." 155
Finally, "[u]nder the third theory, all laws of the state in which the
enclave exists are applicable, unless they interfere with the laws of the
United States."' 5 6 BSA argued for application of the first theory, under
which the post-cession HRL would not apply to the company's activities
within the enclave, while the SDHR argued that the third theory applied
and presented no bar, because the HRL did not interfere with federal
157
law.
The court agreed with BSA, holding that the third theory did not
apply and distinguishing the case of Howard v. Commissioners of the
Sinking Fund of Louisville, 58 upon which the plaintiff relied. The court
noted that in Howard, the city had statutorily annexed a portion of the
property at issue without objection by the federal government, and an
Act of Congress specifically authorized the tax being challenged.' 59
Because neither of those facts was presented in Brookhaven Science
Associates, the court
held that the SDHR's reliance on the third theory
60
was misplaced. 1
Applying the first theory, the court began its analysis by
determining that the BSA performs a federal function at BNL since the
61
laboratory operates under a contract with the Department of Energy.'
The court then rejected the SDHR's argument that the HRL should apply
within the enclave because the law is merely an "indirect regulation of
the activities of a private contractor on a federal enclave," rather than a
direct regulation that would run afoul of the Supremacy Clause and the
federal enclave doctrine. 62 The court also rejected the SDHR's
argument that BSA had waived the federal enclave defense by having
submitted to the SDHR's jurisdiction at BNL at least twenty-four times

1998)).
154.
155.
156.
(1953)).
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. (citing James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 100 (1940)).
Id. (citing Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 268 (1963)).
Id. (citing Howard v. Comm'rs of the Sinking Fund of Louisvile, 344 U.S. 624, 626-27
See id.
344 U.S. 624 (1953).
Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., 2007 WL 239141, at *6.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *7.
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between 1984 and 2000.163 In rejecting this waiver argument, the court
explained that "[b]ecause 'direct regulation of federal facilities is
allowed only to the extent that Congress has clearly authorized such
regulation,' BSA could not have waived the federal enclave defense.' 64
The court then agreed with three decisions from the Eastern District of
New York, which held that the federal enclave doctrine bars
enforcement of the HRL at BNL, and granted to BSA all of the relief it
requested. 165
Thus, the SDHR now is permanently enjoined from investigating
claims of discrimination against BSA at BNL, and the company has in
hand a declaration that the HRL does not apply to its activities there. A
more powerful judgment is difficult to imagine, making Brookhaven
Science Associates a prime example of the federal enclave doctrine's
extraordinary reach.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Lessonsfor Litigants
As Part II of this Article illustrates, the federal enclave doctrine is a
powerful tool for defendants that know of its existence. In rare cases,
such as Arlington Hotel Co., the doctrine also can also be helpful to
plaintiffs. 166 A synthesis of the federal enclave body of law provides a
roadmap for litigants to follow when navigating state or common law
claims through an enclave. This roadmap is useful both to plaintiffs
looking to ensure that their state and common law claims will survive a
federal enclave challenge, and to defendants looking to bring a swift end
to litigation.
At the outset, litigants must carefully consider where the acts that
form the basis of a state or common law claim arose. If the area in
question is within a federal enclave, litigants should determine when the
area was ceded to the federal government, and compare that date to the

163. Id. at *8.
164. Id. (quoting Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 172, 181 n.1 (1988)).
165. See Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., 2007 WL 239141, at *8 (citing Sundaram v. Brookhaven
Nat'l Lab., 424 F. Supp. 2d 545 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Benjamin v. Brookhaven Sci. Assoc., 387 F.
Supp. 2d 146 (E.D.N.Y 2005); Schiappa v. Brookhaven Sci. Assocs., 403 F. Supp. 2d 146
(E.D.N.Y. 2005)).

166. See 278 U.S. 439 (1929) (holding that Arkansas' statute relieving innkeepers of liability to
their guests for losses by fire did not apply to a hotel in Hot Springs National Park because the park
was a federal enclave governed by federal law).
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date on which the state law underlying the claim was enacted.1 67 In a
matter raising a common law claim, litigants must determine when the
state courts recognized the cause of action. If the state or common law
claim was already in existence on the date of cession, then the federal
enclave doctrine is not likely to be a basis for dismissal of the claim,
unless the state or common law arguably conflicts with federal purposes.
If a state or common law claim came into existence after the area
was ceded, then the federal enclave doctrine rises to the fore. In such a
case, litigants should carefully examine the terms under which the state
ceded the territory to the federal government to determine whether the
state has retained jurisdiction over the area of law that will govern the
claim at issue. If the cession was conditioned upon a broad reservation
of jurisdiction by the state, then state laws passed after cession that fall
within the state's reservation ofjurisdiction are likely to apply within the
enclave. If the state did not retain jurisdiction over the substantive area
of law at issue, then litigants should examine federal law to determine
whether Congress authorized state regulation within federal enclaves of
the area of law at issue. As Goodyear Atomic Corp. makes clear,
' 68
however, any such authorization must be "clear and unambiguous."'
If the case centers on a federal enclave, the state or common law
claim at issue came into existence after the land was ceded to the federal
government, the state did not reserve jurisdiction over the area of law in
question, and there is no congressional authorization of state regulation
within the enclave, then plaintiffs should consider whether facts exist to
support an argument that the true impetus for the actions at issue
occurred beyond the enclave. Although such an argument has not
historically met with much success, 16 9 being able to allege facts in the
complaint to support such a contention could be enough to survive a
motion to dismiss, and conceivably could create an issue of fact
sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.
Finally, if the case is filed in state court, defendants should consider
167. If the area was ceded after 1940, litigants also must determine whether the federal
government accepted jurisdiction in accordance with 40 U.S.C. § 3112. See supranote 80.
The Diaz court, discussed supra notes 127-34 and
168. 486 U.S. 174, 180 (1988).
accompanying text, appears to be the only court that has interpreted this requirement loosely.
Indeed, that court went so far as to find congressional authorization in the Service Contract Act,
despite noting that the Act merely "clearly implies" that local wage and hour laws shall apply to
"employees of private companies working on federal installations." 93 F. Supp. 2d at 135
(emphasis added). A mere implication, however, hardly seems to meet the Supreme Court's "clear
and unambiguous" authorization standard.
169. See, e.g, Bussey v. Edison Int'l, No. CV 08-0158, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14057, at *7-8
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2009).
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whether to remove the case to federal court. As noted above, most
courts agree that federal courts have jurisdiction over traditionally state
or common law claims when those claims arise on a federal enclave."
Additionally, defendants should include the federal enclave doctrine in
their list of affirmative defenses when answering a complaint that raises
a potential enclave issue.
B. Lessons for States and Congress
Before relinquishing a portion of land to the federal government, a
state should carefully consider the terms under which it is willing to cede
the territory. Once the federal government accepts the property, the state
loses control over the enclave to the extent it did not specifically reserve
jurisdiction. Further, states should carefully consider whether to
voluntarily cede the property at issue in the first instance. If the state
refuses to voluntarily cede property that the federal government seeks to
use for a federal purpose, then the federal sovereign has the option of
exercising its eminent domain power. Under that scenario, the state's
laws continue to apply within the enclave, and the state must be fairly
compensated for the property. However, such a situation often leads to a
battle of dueling sovereigns, and can tie the property up in costly
litigation for years. Thus, as a matter of policy, it may be more prudent
for the state to voluntarily cede the territory under terms it can more
readily control.
At the very least, a state should specifically reserve the right to
serve civil and criminal process within the enclave. If a state wants its
post-cession laws to be enforced within the enclave, then it should
broadly reserve concurrent jurisdiction over all areas not inconsistent
with federal purposes. Further, the state should consider whether to
include in the Act of Cession a reverter clause stating that the enclave
shall revert back to the state if the federal government ceases to use it for
a stated federal purpose.
On the other side of the coin, Congress should remain mindful that
state laws passed after the creation of a federal enclave are
presumptively unenforceable within those territories. Thus, if Congress
determines that state laws covering certain areas of law should apply
within federal enclaves, then it must provide clear authorization for such
application, using language similar to that approved by the Supreme
Court in Goodyear Atomic Corp. For example, if Congress determines
170.

See supranotes 104-13 and accompanying text.
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that state anti-discrimination laws should apply within federal enclaves,
then federal anti-discrimination statutes should be amended to provide:
States shall have the power and authority to apply [their antidiscrimination laws] to all lands and premises owned or held by the
United States of America by deed or act of cession, by purchase or
otherwise, which is within the exterior boundaries of any State... in
the same way and to the same extent as if said premises were under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the State within whose exterior boundaries
such place may be. 171
Absent such an explicit authorization, courts following Goodyear
Atomic Corp. are likely to hold that no congressional authorization for
enforcement of state laws within a federal enclave exists.
IV. CONCLUSION

Given the large number of federal contractors operating within
federal enclaves, the federal enclave doctrine could prove to be a
sleeping giant for the employment law defense bar. However, the
relatively small body of federal enclave law decided to date suggests that
many defendants remain unaware of the doctrine's existence. As more
defendants discover the doctrine and come to understand its power to
remove cases to federal court, and to eliminate state and common law
claims from cases arising within federal enclaves, plaintiffs will be
called upon to think carefully and conduct research before filing a
complaint to ensure that their claims can survive a federal enclave
challenge. This Article has sought to begin the federal enclave doctrine
discussion, in hopes that the courts will have increasing opportunities to
examine the doctrine's contours and limits as more litigants become
aware of its existence. For the time being, however, the doctrine
remains the most powerful defense that most litigants have never heard
of.

171. Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 172, 182 (1988) (quoting 40 U.S.C. § 290
(2006)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2011

25

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 29, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 4

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol29/iss1/4

26

